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摘 要 
 
i 
 
摘 要 
政府政策、媒体和游说团体通常都鼓励董事会的多样化，因为他们都秉持这有助于提高公
司绩效的理念。在本文中，我们探究是否存在证据表明追求董事会的多样化尤其关注董事
的年龄、性别、种族、任期以及独立性对公司的财务业绩会有实际的好处。使用面板数据
分析，我们检测了来自撒哈拉以南的非洲地区 41个不同国家的 202家银行 2010—2014年
的数据。我们发现没有经验证据表明在撒哈拉以南的非洲，董事会的年龄、经验和独立性
的多样化会影响公司业绩。然而，我们发现存在有力的证据表明，增加董事会之间的性别
和种族的多样化会对公司业绩产生消极影响。 
 
关键词:公司治理;董事会;年龄变化;任期变化;性别多样性;种族多样性;独立;公司绩效;
股本回报率 
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ABSTRACT 
Diversity in the boardroom is often encouraged by government and industrial policies, media or 
lobby groups with the belief that it will improve firm performance. In this study, we ask whether 
there is any evidence of tangible benefits on a firm’s financial performance in pursuing board 
diversity with focus on director age, gender, ethnicity, tenure and independence. Using panel 
data analysis, we examine data of 202 banks from 41 different countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
from 2010 to 2014. We find no empirical evidence that suggests variability in director age, 
experience or independence affects performance of large banks in this region. However, we find 
strong evidence that suggests increasing gender and ethnic diversity among board of directors 
negatively impacts bank performance. 
 
Key words: Corporate governance; Board of Directors; Age variability; Tenure variability; 
Gender diversity; Ethnic Diversity; Independence; Firm performance; Return on Equity 
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CHAPTER 1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance, using internal policies and leadership, provides a system to direct and 
control a company for long-term results. Governance is said to start with shareholders whose 
role, among others, is to appoint directors who are tasked with the duty of ensuring 
accountability, efficiency, fairness and transparency in preserving a company's relationship with 
its stakeholders; creditors, customers, management, employees, government and community 
(Guest, 2012). Therefore, directors acting as agents of shareholders, are a key pillar in building a 
robust and appropriate governance structure; rules and practices that ensure operational and 
financial efficiency and effectiveness. 
Boards play important roles of strategic decision making, governance application and risk 
overseeing, and it is imperative that boards attract a strong body of individuals with diverse pool 
of knowledge. This pool of expertise and experience is potentially driven by the diversity of their 
roles, gender, race and age in addition to their skills or expertise, knowledge, experience, 
information, power and time, which allow a company to pivot amidst today’s business 
complexities. Often such individuals are retired employees, serving managing directors, eminent 
business men and outspoken politicians. This, according to Conger & Lawler (2009), is not only 
good but also strikes a level of confidence and maturity in handling issues with a holistic and risk 
averse mind. Not forgetting the fact that many of these individuals are men, since society had a 
long-standing tilt in the balance towards men, as they are well known for doing such tedious 
work, especially in developing regions like Africa. 
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
CHAPTER 1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 
2 
 
However, we cannot ignore the fact that most of these norms have lost touch with the reality of 
life and its dynamic trends. With markets around the world experiencing volatility and 
dynamism, companies have been forced to go back to their thinking rooms as they look forward 
to meeting the changing market expectations. Lado et al. (2012) more so attribute such volatility 
and dynamism to the growing youth population as well as the embracement of the digital world 
that has become a global village. Gender and equality demands have as well set their way in with 
increasing demand for equal treatment, with an increasing number of pressure groups and non-
government organisations mushrooming in Africa to advocate for women representation in 
corporate leadership. In fact, according to Parrotta et al. (2010), companies in certain industries 
are now being pushed to do integrated and holistic reporting not limited to financial statements 
but including issues of gender, age, corporate governance, environmental as well human 
resources. The sole reporting on profits is long gone. 
Past failures of big companies such as Enron, Worldcom, Parmalat and Lehman Brothers among 
others also revealed serious weaknesses in the existing governance structures raising concerns 
over the efficiency of those in company leadership and the quality of the governance standards 
they uphold. Factors affecting decision making and human productivity on a board have 
henceforth become one of the most critically debated issues in corporate governance. It is upon 
the above premise that some companies see the need to undergo a total overhaul in their board 
composition to create room for diversity. 
According to authors such as Wang et al. (2010), Farrell & Hersch (2011) and Nowell & Tinkler 
(2004), diversity calls for the involvement of most or all stakeholders who contribute to a pool of 
knowledge or ideas on which decision making is based. The youth can advise on the products 
that appeal to them and also ensure continuity in corporate leadership while learning from the 
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more experienced or older directors (Farrel & Hersch, 2011; Brammer et al., 2011). There is as 
well a need to strike a balance between men and women. Men are typically driven by egoistic 
tendencies that force them not to turn back on decisions whereas women are naturally calm in 
their approach to issues to do with interpersonal relations (Syverson, 2011). Additionally, as the 
world continues to become a global village, many multinational companies are looking forward 
to tapping into developing markets. The existence of differences in the levels of growth among 
regions may potentially require cultural diversity on boards for guidance and knowledge 
exchange. 
The increasing demand for diversity of corporate governance according to Wagner (2013), 
however, still poses a challenge as to how best boards should be constituted or structured without 
affecting director efficiency and effectiveness in performing their various roles. The primary 
focus throughout this study is therefore, to empirically test the hypothesis that increased board 
heterogeneity improves firm financial performance. 
1.2 Motivation 
Many studies into the relationship between board heterogeneity and firm performance have 
mainly been done on firms in countries from developed regions such as North and South 
America and Europe. Hardly any studies have covered developing regions like Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA). SSA’s high economic growth potential presents to many Multi-National 
Companies (MNCs) attractive investment opportunities that at the same time have the potential 
to pose many complex risks, which could threaten their survival. A proper understanding of the 
influence of corporate governance characteristics on firm performance in such a market is 
therefore, necessary in promoting company success.  
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The coverage of this region in many studies has been limited mainly by the challenges of data 
collection and availability. This study draws data from audited annual financial reports and 
statements of 202 firms from 41 different countries in SSA to study the impact of board 
heterogeneity on firm performance in SSA. As a growing region, the data bank structures are not 
yet fully and equally developed across countries and industries. Due to the easier access to 
information/data from the finance industry compared with other industries resulting from strict 
reporting regulations and standards, the study focuses on the banking sector of this region, which 
has not been covered by prior studies. The study, moreover, uses a more recent period (2010 to 
2014) providing an extension of the few practical studies that have previously covered some of 
the countries in this region. 
Secondly, a number of authors such as Tyrer (2012), Berman et al. (2012), Wagner (2013), Zahra 
& Pearce (2011) among others based their conclusions on the impact of director age variability 
purely on theoretical analysis, hence the limited availability of empirical evidence of such 
impacts. This study uses firm and time fixed effect methodology to provide empirical evidence 
on the impact of director age variability on firm performance.  
Thirdly, the findings from the existing studies on the impact of director age and tenure variability 
on firm performance are mixed and inconclusive. One cause identified by Humpert & Pfeifer 
(2013) is the difference in measures of variability. The different measures that have been used 
before include Blau’s index of heterogeneity, variance and standard deviation1. This study adopts 
                                                          
1 Blau’s index is a quantitative measure of diversity that indicates how many different entities (such as individuals) 
are in a data set or how evenly they are distributed.  
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the coefficient of variation a measure of variability2. For purposes of comparison, variance and 
standard deviation were used to carry out a sensitivity check to test for any significant 
differences that could potentially arise from using another measure of variability. 
The remaining parts of the thesis are structured as follows: chapter 2 covers the relevant 
literature review; chapter 3 deals with the research methodology, chapter 4 presents on the 
empirical results and discussion while chapter 5 shows the conclusions made from this study. 
                                                          
2 Mahadeo et al. (2011) used co-efficient of variation to study the impact of age differences among factory workers 
on employee productivity.  
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Many firms have been compelled to attract the best corporate leadership talents without biases of 
age, ethnicity or gender among other factors. This has, over the last two decades, driven many 
researchers to intensively examine the role of board heterogeneity on firm performance.  This 
section explores the existing literature on the impacts of board heterogeneity based on board 
characteristics such as age, gender, ethnicity, tenure and director independence on firm 
performance. We begin by briefly exploring the agency theory, a theory that guides corporate 
governance as board directors act as agents of shareholders. 
2.1 Agency theory 
This theory explains the relationship between a company’s principals (shareholders) and their 
agents (such as the company’s board and or management executives) who are hired and tasked 
with the duty of ensuring operational and financial efficiency while preserving a company's 
relationship with its stakeholders, creditors, customers, management, employees, government 
and community (Guest, 2012). Many companies or firms have as many as a million shareholders 
that may, voluntarily or involuntarily, not be available to participate in the day to day company 
businesses but are willing to contribute equity to the increase its capital base. Therefore, these 
shareholders through their Annual General Meetings (AGMs), appoint directors to a board who 
on their behalf are tasked with the duty of monitoring the company’s financial and non-financial 
performance. 
Based on the assumption that both shareholders and directors are motivated by self-interest, an 
agency problem (inevitable inherent conflicts) potentially exists as directors are likely to pursue 
their own goals or interests that may deviate from the principals, hence leading to agency losses, 
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